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Abstract
Sharing economy businesses are increasingly
important, but the relationships between their
strategies and their platforms’ structure has received
insufficient attention. To address this gap, we develop
testable hypotheses building on following
expectations. 1) Sharing economy businesses are
attacking mature markets; 2) most sharing economy
businesses follow one of Porter’s two basic strategies,
seeking a price advantage or a differentiation
advantage; and 3) platforms that support
differentiation-based strategies must provide more
information to their users than platforms that support
cost-based strategies. We located a database of 100
investment-grade sharing economy businesses to test
our hypotheses. Our hypotheses received strong
support from this database.

1. Introduction
The recent impact of sharing economy businesses
cannot be missed. You can now share everything you
own with a total stranger, from your car and your spare
bedroom to a home-prepared dinner around the world.
The sharing economy allows you to share physical
durables, of course; the best-known examples, Uber
and Airbnb, allow you to share the use of your car or
the use of your home, for a fee. A broader view of the
sharing economy would include what we term the
participatory economy [24]. Well-known platforms
like TaskRabbit involve creating a spot market for
individuals willing and able to perform simple tasks.
While this does not involve sharing durable physical
goods in the same ways that Uber and Airbnb do, we
believe that these participatory economy platforms can
be considered examples of the sharing economy.
Platforms vary enormously in the amount of
information that they present to individual users, in the
search facilities they offer users to identify service
providers, and in the degree of choice that they allow
individual users in selecting specific service providers.
We believe that those differences are not random, and
that differences in the levels of information provided,
in the filters for selection, and in the degree of choice
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supported all reflect underlying differences among the
strategies pursued by the platform operators.
We chose to study this topic for several reasons.
First, platform-based business is increasingly
important. Although the impact of platform-based
business is now universally acknowledged, there is as
yet no sound and generally accepted theory that will
predict when platforms will succeed or how platforms
should be structured to facilitate adoption and success.
That is not to say we do not understand user interface
considerations for platform design when we fully
understand the functions to be supported. Rather, it
suggests that we do not yet understand what
information is required, what degree of trust is
required, and what degree of user choice is required to
ensure success in a platform-based business.
Second, the sharing economy is increasingly
important. Major manufacturers need to understand
when their products are sharable and how that will
affect demand. Traditional intermediaries need to
understand when their owned-inventory model
represents higher cost, or more limited choice, and is
unsustainable. In order to assess the chances for future
success, entrepreneurs and investors need to
understand when it is possible, even easy, to attack an
existing market, and when it is difficult. It would be
extremely useful to have a strong predictive theory for
assessing the potential success for sharing economy
platform-based businesses (SEPBs).
Moreover, it is now possible to perform at least
some statistical analyses on sharing economy
platform-based businesses. There are now well over
100 SEPBs that have received rounds of private equity
funding. Many of these are reviewed in a range of
publications, and there is financial data or investment
history data available for many of them as well.
To address the research gap discussed above, we
started with an in-depth analysis of four well-known,
well-funded, widely used, and generally successful
SEPBs. Among these four SEPBs, we observed patterns for which we believe there are sound theoretical
explanations. We used abductive reasoning and these
explanations to generate our hypotheses. The process
of hypothesis generation is described in more detail in
the methodology section. The hypothesis examine
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relationships between the strategy of the SEPBs and
the structure of their websites, and between the strategy of the SEPB and the structure of the marketplace
they are seeking to enter. We call these internal and
external consistency.
In this paper, we test our hypotheses using a data
set of SEPBs. The data set was selected by Drew Mentock, writing for Money Nomad, an online journal
(http://www.moneynomad.com/about) aimed at investors who hope to succeed with strategies involving
online businesses. Since this is not an academic journal, we did not base any part of our analysis upon the
content of the article; we merely used the article to provide a list of websites. Since this data set was compiled based on the Mentock’s assessment of the SEPBs
attractiveness to investors, it should represent a sample
of businesses with above average chances of success.
That is, we are studying businesses that are considered
to have made better than average decisions in design
and in strategy. Since this data set was selected by others, it should be free of the sort of sample bias that
might have been introduced, even unintentionally, if
we were allowed to select those candidate businesses
we choose to study. We show that successful SEPBs
do share several characteristics in common, including
attacking newly vulnerable markets and matching
their website structure to their strategies.

2. Literature Review
In an era of information-based micro segmentation,
Porter’s generic business strategies of cost-based or
differentiation-based leadership [21, 20] no longer
represent a binary classification nor is each company
represented by one or the other of the two alternatives.
Individual products can be located in any position on
the continuum between cost and differentiation that is
economically feasible for production. Multi-product
firms can embrace a complex set of positions on this
continuum.
Still, it seems likely that any single platform-based
offering will represent either a focus on cost or a focus
on differentiation. This seems plausible at this time, in
part because the sharing economy is newer than other
markets for products and services, and less crowded,
so that simpler strategies may remain effective. Larger
SEPBs over time may develop a portfolio of offerings,
which may embrace a range of strategies. With the
assumption that start-up SEPBs can be classified as
either competing with a focus on cost or with a focus
on differentiation, we use Porter’s two generic
strategies to represent one dimension of our analysis
of digital platforms. We classify strategies of the
SEPBs using Porter’s classification, and study to
understand which of these strategies determine the

structures of these firms. Since the classification
produced statistically significant results, we deem it
acceptable at this stage of development of the sharing
economy.
There is a large literature in corporate strategy and
organizational design, going back to Chandler [5], that
argues that the structure of a firm is determined by its
strategy. The earliest examples suggest that a firm
with a multi-business strategy (like Sears & Roebuck)
or a multi-product strategy (like GM) will have
multiple divisions. More recently, firms (like Apple),
which focus on design and product innovation but not
component innovation, have internal capability for
design and marketing but virtually no internal
manufacturing capability.
We argue throughout this paper that strategy of a
SEPB drives the structure of its website and the user
interface, and not merely the structure of the firm.
This is tested in our hypotheses.

2.1 Theory of Newly Vulnerable Markets
Newly vulnerable markets provide a theory to explain
and understand changes in competition, in which new
competitors are able to attack stronger incumbents,
even in what look like mature industries. Digital
platforms have changed the landscape of competition
in a number of industries. SEPBs are by definition
attacking markets in which the sharable assets are
sufficiently broadly held by individual consumers.
The theory of newly vulnerable markets (NVM)
[8] assesses whether an industry is vulnerable to new
entrants. It builds on the theory of contestable markets
[3], which posits that in monopolies or oligopolies that
are under continuous threat of new entry, prices would
be similar to perfect competition to eliminate the
incentives of new entrants to enter the market because
of zero profits. In contrast, oligopolies and monopolies
that are not contestable do exhibit some degree of
monopoly profits.
The theory of NVM depicts three conditions to
determine market vulnerability. First, the market
needs to have become newly easy to enter. This occurs
when technological or regulatory changes reduce the
entry barriers or when changes in consumer
preferences weaken the competitive advantage of
previously dominant firms. Cellphone service
destroyed the old AT&T because technology made it
possible for new entrants to offer telephony service
that could interact with all other phones regardless of
their networks, while regulation made it possible for
new firms to compete and, changes in consumer
preferences made wireless telephony preferred over
traditional landlines.
Second, the market must be attractive to attack.
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This implies the presence of a strong customer
profitability gradient. This usually occurs when
existing firms in an industry charge the same prices to
all customers, even when customers differ
substantially in willingness to pay for goods and
services, or in their costs to serve. New entrants may
target the most lucrative consumers, for example, the
air travelers who are easiest to serve, or the banking
customers who pay the highest finance charges each
month because they maintain large unpaid balances.
Third, the market must be difficult to defend. This
occurs when the incumbents experience barriers in
changing their strategy to imitate the attacker’s
strategy.
The theory has been used in a variety of case
studies, including the credit card industry [9] and the
electronic travel distribution services [14]. Using
NVM as a predictor of success, we investigate whether
the markets, where the SEPBs have entered, are newly
vulnerable, which would suggest that they have
selected markets with a high probability of success.
2.2 Theory of Resonance Marketing
The theory of resonance marketing [6] explains that
companies that now seek full differentiation and
delight-based strategies are dependent upon the
amount of information that customers have. In pure
resonance marketing strategies, the information is
provided by the environment, not by advertising, a
condition called organic informedness [7]. We believe
that SEPBs that follow a delight-based strategy,
offering the individual user an ever-changing array of
choices to satisfy every want or need, will need to
provide that informedness themselves, since users will
not be familiar, for example, with each individual
property offered in Paris, or each amateur chef willing
to prepare meals in Bangkok. The theory of resonance
marketing suggests that the information-based
structure of the SEPB website will need to follow the
strategy selected for the business.
The theory of resonance marketing argues that the
compromise discount creates an uncertainty discount
in the presence of uncertainty about a product’s true
location in its product attribute space. The more
uncertain a consumer is about a product that is ideal
for him or her, the greater the range of unacceptable
things the product could turn out to be, and thus, the
more truly inferior locations that product could
occupy. As uncertainty is reduced, also the range of
inferior possibilities is reduced, and the smaller the
expected compromise discount becomes. As the
expected compromise discount decreases, consumers’
willingness to pay eventually approaches the user’s
full valuation for any individual offering.

The work in resonance marketing that is most
relevant to our current study shows that companies
that want to follow a strategy based on delighting
consumers must be aware of the uncertainty discount,
and find mechanisms for reducing uncertainty [16,
12].

2.3 Sharing Economy and Platforms
The current understanding of the sharing economy,
while very different from its original meaning in
anthropology [22], typically refers to new assemblages
or hybrids of economic modalities enabled by digital
technologies and platforms. Habibi et al. [15] position
sharing economy on a continuum between pure
sharing and pure exchange. Sundararajan [24] defines
the sharing economy as platforms engaged in crowdbased capitalism mixing gift and market economies.
Likewise, Constantiou et al. [10] describe sharing
economy platforms as mixing organizational with
market coordination mechanisms. Sharing economy
platforms are also viewed as multi-sided; they
facilitate the transactions between different parties
who would not necessarily transact otherwise [19].
These descriptions have much in common, but they
have slight differences in emphasis that we need to
clarify in order to understand the hypotheses and the
SEPB classifications in this paper.
For the purpose of our research, we define SEPBs
as platforms that facilitate the peer-to-peer allocation
of temporary access to idle resources that are owned
by individuals rather than corporations. In particular,
our definition reflects the motivations and benefits
generally ascribed to the sharing economy. First, the
sharing economy allows consuming without buying,
which enables consumption at lower costs [18].
Access over ownership refers to the temporary use of
consumer goods without a transfer of ownership [23].
Second, peer-to-peer networks enable direct transactions between individuals and complement traditional
business activities [2]; the sharing economy is different from prior business-to-consumer rental services.
Peer-to-peer networks do not involve intermediaries
and are based on trust and reputation [1]. Third, the
allocation of idle resources allows for lowering costs
of their access and also for more sustainable resource
consumption [23, 25].
None of these three developments is new or
exclusive to the sharing economy. However, with the
rapid diffusion of digital infrastructures, platforms,
and end-user devices, these developments have
opened up new opportunities for value creation and
commercial success. As demonstrated by Uber and
Airbnb, SEPBs utilize such opportunities to their
advantage as they enter mature markets and attack
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global and local incumbents alike [11].
The impact of sharing economy platforms on
market dynamics is not yet fully understood. We can
only draw on first, tentative insights and findings. For
instance, Weber [26] suggests that incumbents
offering high-cost goods may actually benefit from
sharing economy markets, since sales of expensive
items may be increased if the purchaser can recover
some of the cost through shared access.

3. Empirical Study
Given the lack of empirical research and theoretical
elaborations relating the strategy of sharing economy
business to the structure of its online platform, we
began our research following an exploratory case
study research design. As noted by Yin, this is
intended to develop propositions for future research
[27]. Our case study research design and practice
followed established guidelines for operations and IS
research [13, 4] inasmuch as we 1) purposefully
selected cases, which promised to reveal rich, in-depth
data, 2) formulated research questions to focus our
analysis, and 3) conducted within-case and 4) crosscase analysis. We present the findings of the case
studies as hypotheses followed by the results of their
statistical testing.

3.1 Generation of Hypotheses
As noted above, we started by using a small set of
semantically rich case studies to develop theory
followed by a set of hypotheses for the next stage of
our study [17]. We studied Uber and Lyft in the ride
hailing / ride sharing market; and Airbnb and Home
Away as examples of temporary accommodations in
the sharing economy, all of which are generally agreed
to have been successful.
We observe that for these four SEPBs, business
strategy drives platform structure and note that they
have some attributes in common: they each follow one
of the two classic strategies, defined as canonical
strategies by Porter [21]. Uber and Lyft follow costbased strategies; and Airbnb and Home Away follow
differentiation-based strategies. Of course, Uber and
Lyft, Airbnb and Home Away, are neither products
nor services; they are distribution channels for
services. When we say that Uber and Lyft for costbased strategies we mean that the services they offer
are less expensive than taxi services. When we say
that Airbnb and Home Away follow differentiationbased strategies we mean that the services they offer
seek to provide resonance and delight.
More interestingly, however, these four platforms
adopt one of two very different structures. The two
platforms that follow a cost-based strategy offer a

simple website/app that provides the user with very
little choice and thus require very little information.
An Uber user is simply informed about his driver, his
driver’s car, his driver’s identifying information, and
enough information on the driver’s rating to ensure a
minimal level of trust and acceptance. Any further
information, or any greater degree of user-interaction,
would simply slow the operation of the ride matching
service with no appreciable gain in user satisfaction.
In contrast, the two platforms that follow a
differentiation-based strategy offer robust information
allowing the user to make a fully informed decision
about which property to rent. The absence of
information about location, size, condition,
furnishings, accessories, internet access, and
convenience to public transportation, would reduce
potential guests’ willingness to rent and reduce their
willingness to pay. As we know from research on
informed differentiation-based strategies [7], buyers
don’t just want the average of all reviews; they often
want to examine the entire text of reviews.
Differentiation-based strategies involve consumers
who are seeking delight [9] and in those cases
consumers must be presented with a sufficient amount
of information in order to ensure that delight.
Thus, we note that differences in platform strategy
result in differences in platform structure reflected in
the way information and choice is offered on the
respective website (for reasons of expediency, we
subsume apps under the term “website”). This is the
basis of our first set of hypotheses regarding strategy,
structure, and information (H1A - H1C and H2).
H1A — If the SEPB is following a differentiationbased strategy it will provide robust information on
individual services or service providers.
Often this information is required to allow the
users to choose which service or provider s/he wishes,
which will generate the highest degree of delight.
Alternatively, when the differentiated service requires
speedy execution, choice may not be possible. We
expect differentiation-based strategies to require
robust information, without needing to allow the users
to make choices. This robust information is necessary
to enable the user to believe that the offering selected
for him or her will provide the required level of
delight. Again, we refer to earlier work on the
relationships among information, trust, and resonance
marketing [6].
H1B — If the SEPB is following a cost-based
strategy it will provide far less information on
individual services or service providers and will not
allow the users to choose which service or provider he
wishes.
Most cost-based SEPBs do not seek to provide
resonance and delight, do not need to allow users to
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make choices, and therefore do not need to provide the
users with robust information.
H1C — If the SEPB is following a cost-based
strategy, but for goods and services that might be
considered risky, it will provide robust information on
individual services or service providers. Even when
the platform will not allow the users to choose which
service or provider s/he wishes, it will provide enough
information for the user to make an informed decision
about whether or not to proceed.
We generated hypothesis H1C after considering
the conditions under which we would allow a young
child or an elderly person to be assigned to a ride
service, and concluded that we would need far more
information than for example Uber or Lyft currently
provide before we would accept their selected car and
driver, even if we did not require the ability to select
the car and driver ourselves.
H1A through H1C test for internal consistency,
and a match between strategy and structure, for three
separate types of service. H2 tests the entire data set
for internal consistency.
H2 — Those SEPBs that were promising enough
to capture the attention of the creator of our data set
will have structures that match their strategy.
H1 suggests the ways in which strategy should
drive structure. H2 suggests that websites considered
promising to be included in the list of investment grade
websites will indeed have strategy driving structure.
We also noticed that all four platform businesses
that we studied in-depth (i.e. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb,
Home Away) are attacking existing mature
marketplaces. The markets for local transportation and
for short term rental accommodations are both multibillion dollar industries, and both have existed in one
form or another for centuries. Although all four SEPBs
are attacking existing marketplaces for existing goods
and services, we note that they all are attacking what
we consider to be newly vulnerable markets. First, for
the sharing economy to function, the goods in question
must be sufficiently widely held for there to be enough
in circulation for them to be shared. Additionally, if
the platform is attacking a market for goods or services
that are already widely held, the platform creators and
their investors should want to have a strong reason for
expecting success when attacking an existing market.
The theory of NVM offers a sound and tested theory
for predicting and explaining success.H1 and H2 led
to the formulation of Hypotheses H3 through H5.
H3 — SEPBs will attempt to attack NVMs.
H4 — Successful SEPBs will be those that have
attacked NVMs.
H5 — Successful SEPBs will be those that have
attacked NVMs with structures that match their
strategies.

3.2 Analysis of a Database of SEPBs
We analyzed a set of 104 SEPBs that were considered
to be investment grade opportunities by Money
Nomad.1 We used this curated list because it was large
enough for statistical analyses, because the businesses
included were considered high quality SEPBs, and
because the SEPBs in the list were selected by
someone outside our group, without awareness of our
hypotheses. Together these conditions ensured that the
websites were relevant to our study but were not
selected because of conscious or unconscious biases,
or by a desire to examine websites that supported our
hypotheses.
We classified all 104 SEPBs on a number of
dimensions, looking at the descriptions of the
businesses in the article, the companies’ own websites,
the descriptions of the businesses available in the
popular press and the investment community press,
and Facebook and Yelp contents as available.
First, we checked to see if the business was still
operating. A business that had been acquired by
another sharing economy platform and merged was
studied as part of the new business and not as an
individual case. In contrast, a business that had been
acquired by an unrelated business but was continuing
to operate was included and studied in the context of
its current operations. A business that had failed and
closed was dropped from inclusion in our study, since
we are trying to make predictions about the strategy
and structure of successful SEPBs.
Next, we checked to see if we could consider the
business as an SEPB. In line with our definition of
SEPBs, we restricted our analysis to businesses that
increased the size of the market by bringing new
providers of goods and services into the marketplace,
where those new providers were not professionals in
the same sense as existing market participants. Using
our definition, Uber and Lyft are both sharing
economy businesses. An aggregator or an integrated
search engine, that for instance functioned as a
citywide dispatch service for all taxi companies, or
created a travel marketplace like Orbitz, would not
have been considered as an SEPB and would have
been dropped from our study. We considered
businesses that increased the size of a market by
creating a spot market for access to individuals on a
short-term basis, and defined these as participation
economy businesses. As noted above, we decided to
include participation economy businesses in our
sample of SEPBs even if they did not involve sharing
physical goods.
We then began classifying each identified
company on several dimensions. We first determined
if the business was cost-based or differentiation-based.
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Often this was clear from the websites of Money
Nomad and the company itself. If necessary, we went
to additional sources, but were always able to
determine the principal strategy of the website and the
business.
We next determined if the SEPB was attacking a
newly vulnerable market or not. If there was a mature
existing market, and if there was a customer
profitability gradient that facilitated targeting specific
customers online, and if there were structural reasons
why incumbents could not immediately duplicate the
strategies of successful attackers, then all necessary
conditions of a newly vulnerable market were
satisfied.
Third, we explored by examining the websites’
user interfaces whether or not it was providing a
limited or a robust set of information to its users.
There is a continuum ranging from very little
information to a description, photographs, maps, and
testimonials, but all authors were able to agree on all
of the classifications. (See Appendix A for an example
of robust information.)
Fourth, we explored whether the website provided
users with a single recommendation, which the user
could accept or reject, or whether the website offered
the user a range of choices. Also this classification
required examining websites and their user interfaces.
The final classification we performed was
determining how to assess a SEPB as successful or
not. In most cases, this was the most complex part of
our analysis. In the case of international giants like
Uber and Airbnb the determination was easy. For
small startups, there is no single definition of success
of the SEPB. We agreed to consider a business
successful if it had at least three successful rounds of
venture capital or private equity financing; or, it had
raised at least $1 million in venture funds; or, it
operated in at least three countries or at least 10 cities;
or, it had at least 100,000 users or at least 10 thousand
service providers; or, it was currently operating at a
profit.
When we could not conclusively demonstrate a
criterion as satisfied we needed to proceed as if the
criterion was not satisfied. Even though this set of
criteria might be considered as too inclusive, we found
that a large subset of our database could be classified
as successful.
The full data set we used, along with our
classification of each of the entries and the reasons
behind our classification, is available as Appendix B.

4. SEPB Strategy and Structure
Hypotheses H1A through H1C and H2 test the
internal consistency of the website. We examine each

SEPB website to determine if the information it
displays is consistent with its choice as a provider of
differentiated goods and services or as the provider of
low cost goods and services. We also verify that the
information it displays is consistent with the users’
perceived risk profile associated with the goods and
services the website offers. We divide the SEPBs
based on their strategies simply into firms that
compete as a low cost / low price provider, and firms
that compete as a value-added provider of
differentiated products and services [21, 20].
Table 1 shows a classification of the 67 surviving
SEBPs, which constitute the sample we use for the
statistical tests. Surviving SEBPs are those that are still
independent businesses, are still operating at the time
that we completed our analysis, and which are part of
the sharing economy as we defined it (i.e. including
participatory economy SEPBs). The first classification
of the sample is according to both their strategy and
whether or not users are empowered to make
selections among alternative service providers.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of surviving SEPBs
Strategy
Cost
Differentiation
Provision of No Choice 21 (95,5%) 1 (4,5%)
Choices to Choice
4 (8,9%)
41 (91,1%)
Users
Total
25
42

Total
22
45
67

Table 2 displays the classification of SEPBs based
on strategy and information provision. A chi-square
test of independence was performed to examine the
relation between SEPB’s strategy and information
provision to the platform participants. The result was
significant (X2 (1, N = 67) = 40,226, p <0,01) and
supported H1A and H1B. SEBPs following a costbased strategy are less likely to provide robust
information to the participants, while SEBPs
following a differentiation-based strategy are more
likely to provide robust information to the participants.
Table 2. SEPBs strategy and information provision
Strategy
Cost
Differentiation Total
20 (90,9%) 2 (9,1%)
22

Information No robust
Provision
Information
Robust
5 (11,1%)
Information
Total
25

40 (88,9%)

45

42

67

We realize that there are factors other than
differentiation-based strategy that might require the
provision of additional information. When considering
extensions to Uber’s basic ride service, letting a
stranger delivery your restaurant meal seems even less
risky than getting in the stranger’s car, so we would
expect the level of information about the driver on
websites for food delivery to be similar to the level of
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information for the driver of your ride. In contrast, we
might want a lot more information about the driver
before we would feel comfortable letting him or her
drive a small child to day care. Table 3 augments the
analysis of table 2 and now includes an analysis of
cost-based services where the user might perceive a
higher degree of risk. We expect to see that the amount
of information provided to users would be higher,
whether or not users are allowed to select among
individual service providers.
The result was significant (X2 (2, N = 67) =
43,249, p < .01) and supported H1C and H2.
Table 3. SEPBs refined strategy and information
provision
Strategy
Cost and
risky
services
0 (0%)

Cost
Information No robust 20
Provision
Information (90,9%)
Robust
4
1 (2,2%)
Information (8,9%)
Total
24
1

Differentiati Total
on
2 (9,1%)
22
40 (88,9%) 45
42

67

SEPBs following a cost-based strategy are less
likely to provide robust information to the participants
in the absence of risk to the user. In contrast, SEPBs
that follow a differentiation-based strategy and those
that follow a cost-based strategy that users perceive as
involving risk are both more likely to provide robust
information to the participants.

5. SEPB as an Attack on Newly Vulnerable
Markets
The three hypotheses (H3-H5) address the extent to
which the business is attacking a marketplace in which
there should be a rational expectation for success.
We use the theory of NVM as a plausible basis for
expecting success when entering a market for goods
and services that have existed for decades, or even for
centuries. Newly vulnerable markets require three
attributes, as described above. First, we find that the
principal purpose of an SEPB platform is to exploit a
new technological opportunity that made a market
newly easy to enter.
The principal function of markets is pooling buyers
and sellers with sufficient liquidity to allow
transactions to match and trades to occur. This in turn
allows markets to determine market clearing prices.
Historically markets existed in a fixed place, so that
buyers and sellers could congregate to trade, and; they
were often for relatively simple tradeable items, which
could therefore be traded without the need for
extensive physical inspection.
Increasingly, online markets exist where both of
these attributes are absent. When guests rent a space

via Airbnb they are often time zones and even oceans
removed from the renters who provide their space;
they are not meeting in a single space. Likewise, when
users hail a ride from Uber or Lyft they are seldom
able to see their driver or the vehicle; no physical
inspection is possible beforehand. Since both
historical constraints can be removed, this suggests
that there are now markets that are newly easy to enter.
However, newly vulnerable markets must also be
attractive to attack. This usually occurs when there is
a customer profitable gradient, when some customers
are demonstrably more profitable to serve and these
customers can be identified, targeted, and captured as
customers for the new attacker.
The existence of the profitability gradient for each
of these SEPB’s customer-bases is more complicated
to demonstrate. For Uber X, we were able to show that
these customers are profitable because drivers do not
have to wait or cruise, because the customers would
pay higher prices in periods of peak demand, and
because drivers do not require more expensive
commercial insurance or commercial licenses. For
Airbnb we were able to show that these customers are
more profitable because they do not require the
expensive infrastructure of hotels, or in fact that they
were not being served at all.
This was also true of those examples in our larger
data set where we believed that the SEPB was attacking a newly vulnerable market. For example, the
distribution of alcoholic beverages is a market that has
existed for millennia, but Saucey serves customers
(www.saucey.com/) who are willing to pay for effortless and immediate delivery of alcohol. Similarly, Just
Park (www.justpark.com/) serves customers willing
to pay for effortless and immediate access to parking
space.
Finally, if SEPBs are to be seen as an attack on
newly vulnerable markets we then need to demonstrate
that the markets they are targeting are difficult for the
established market participants to defend. This was
easy to demonstrate for Uber and Airbnb. Taxi
companies are prohibited from adopting the lower cost
structure of Uber, and they cannot match supply and
demand by adjusting prices or by bringing a large
number of additional vehicles to match temporary
supply shortages. Likewise, hotels are prohibited by
regulation and zoning restrictions from matching the
strategy of Airbnb hosts.
This was also true of those examples in our larger
data set where we believed that the SEPB was
attacking a newly vulnerable market.
We consider two examples from our SEPB startup
database. Consider Postmates (www.postmates.com/),
which attacks postal and parcel delivery companies,
because regulations make it impossible for them to
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match supply and demand by adjusting prices, and
because they cannot bring a large number of additional
employees to match temporary supply shortages.
Similarly, LawTrades (www.lawtrades.com) attacks
law firms, which cannot adjust their personnel
resources to address temporary supply shortage or cannot reduce the service prices since the firms have fixed
costs.
Thus, our assessment of Uber and Airbnb is
consistent with our proposition that SEPBs attack
newly vulnerable markets, and consistent with H3
through H4. More importantly, we were able to find
support for H3 through H4 in our larger dataset.
We explore the 44 (of the 67 in the sample) that we
identified were attacking NVMs, to see the extent to
which strategy determines information disclosure.
Only one of them involved a risky decision, and that
site did provide robust information. However, sample
of one is too small for statistical testing, and we drop
it from further analysis.
Table 4 indicates which followed cost-based
strategies and which followed differentiation-based
strategies. Likewise, the table indicates which had
structures that provided complete and robust
information to enable consumer choice and which did
not. We expect that websites that offer products and
services that require an extreme level of trust will not
observe that same simple provision of limited
information that other cost-focused websites are able
to deploy, but without a larger sample we cannot test
this.
Table 4. SEBPs which attack a NVM
Strategy
Cost
Differentiation Total
15 (88,2%)
2 (11,8%)
17

Information No robust
Provision
Information
Robust
1 (3,7%)
Information
Total
16

26 (96,3%)

27

28

44

Table 5 shows which of the 56 SEPB websites that
we considered successful were attacking newly
vulnerable markets. A chi-square test of independence
was performed to examine the relation between
SEPB’s success and attack of a NVM. The result was
significant (X2 (1, N = 67) = 5,014, p <0.05), and
supported H4. SEPBs which are considered successful
are more likely to have attacked a NVM, while SEPBs
which are not consider successful a less likely to have
attacked a NVM.
Table 5. SEBPs based on success and whether
attacking a NVM
NVM

No
Yes
Total

Success
No
7
4
11

Yes
16
40
56

Total
23
44
67

We should not be surprised to observe a lack of
perfect correlation between matching strategy and
structure and achieving initial success. Companies that
create new markets can succeed as well, without
attacking an existing newly vulnerable markets —
social media is a prime example of this. Companies
that create markets that do not appear vulnerable can
still succeed because of superior products. Likewise,
companies that initially appear successful when
attacking stable markets may look good briefly and
then collapse - many of the dot-com failures exemplify
this well.
Finally, we combine the internal consistency
checks (H1A-H1C and H2) with the checks for
attacking a newly vulnerable market (H3 and H4). H5
examines which successful SEPBs were attacking a
newly vulnerable market and had strategy related to
structure in the way we predicted.
Table 6 shows our classification of the 40 SEPBs
that were attacking newly vulnerable markets. The
table indicates which followed cost-based strategies
and which followed differentiation-based strategies.
Likewise, the table indicates which had structures that
provided complete and robust information to enable
consumer choice and which did not.
Table 6. SEBPs considered successful
Strategy
Cost
Differentiation Total
14 (87,5%) 2 (12,5%)
16

Information No robust
Provision
Information
Robust
1 (4,2%)
Information
Total
15

23 (95,8%)

24

25

40

A chi-square test of independence was performed
to examine the relation between SEPB’s strategy and
information provision to the platform participants. The
result was significant (X2 (1, N = 40) = 28,444, p
<0,01) and supported H5. Successful SEPBs that
attack an NVM and that follow a cost-based strategy
are less likely to provide robust information to their
participants, while successful SEBPs that attack an
NVM and that follow a differentiation-based strategy
are more likely to provide robust information to the
participants.

6. Conclusions
6.1 Limitations of the Current Study
Our data sets are small. We are currently developing a
larger data set of SEPBs for which we can determine
strategy and structure, and for which we can assess
success with a reasonable degree of accuracy. This
data set is being prepared by a research assistant with
no other responsibility for the project. She is selecting
as many SEPBs as she can locate, without preselecting
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or prescreening them using any criteria related to our
hypotheses. This represents a first, but critical step,
towards reducing selection bias in our study of an
expanded sample. Recall that our data set in this initial
sample was selected by third parties, to ensure an
absence of selection bias.
This larger data set will also be more comprehensive, and will capture data like the age of a website.
This will be useful in subsequent analyses, such as
those that allow us to test whether matching strategy
to structure is a characteristic of all websites, or rather
is a characteristic of websites that survive.

6.2 Managerial Implications
If our results are robust and supported by future
studies, they can provide guidance to incumbents who
need to prepare for attack from SEPBs and who need
guidance on how to prepare for attack. They can also
provide guidance to entrepreneurs considering
opportunities for new businesses and venture capitalists and private equity funds considering which opportunities are indeed promising enough to justify investment.
More precisely, we are saying two things here. If
our results are supported by future studies then innovators considering launching an SEPB should carefully match the structure of the website to the strategy behind the selection of candidates for the service being
offered. Websites in support of resonance strategies
should provide information-rich interfaces, while
those in support of efficiency should provide less
information. We called this internal consistency.
Moreover, since virtually all services in the sharing
economy have an established traditional counter-part,
innovators considering launching an SEPB should
have a reason for anticipating success; that is, the
established market they are attacking should be newly
vulnerable. We termed this external consistency.
These implications derive directly from out
contribution to theory, below.
6.3 Contributions to Theory
The first two hypotheses make a small contribution to
theory and they suggest that those websites that met
the Money Nomad list of promising SEPBs illustrated
an internal consistency. For those websites, strategy
drives structure. The third and fourth hypotheses make
an additional contribution. Since by definition sharing
economy businesses share existing goods and services,
they are likewise almost by definition attacking
existing markets. Their designers and investors should
have a reasonable theoretical basis to expect
successful attack. The theory of NVM provides one
such theory for predicting successful attack.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 confirm that promising SEPBs are
not only internally consistent with strategy matching
structure, but they are also externally consistent with
strategy matching existing market conditions.
Finally, the fifth hypothesis may generate the
most interesting results. Hypothesis 5 argues that
successful SEPBs will be those that have attacked
NVMs with structures that match their strategies. Our
findings
show
that
successful
websites
overwhelmingly exhibit internal and external
consistency. Strategy of the firm drives the function of
the website, which in turn drives the structure of the
website and of the user interface. In brief, in a different
context from Chandler’s [5], and at the level of product
design rather than organizational structure, we find
that structure is driven by strategy. Strategy is
consistent with marketplace economics.
What is significant is that we have developed simple
tests for internal and external consistency. We show
that not only are successful websites consistent with
their marketplace (externally consistent) they are also
internally consistent, in that design matches strategy.
Successful websites satisfy both of our conditions for
consistency.
6.4 Suggestions for Future Research
The most important suggestion is to repeat the
research with a larger data set. This work has already
started, with efforts to locate other curated lists of
promising SEPBs, and to locate our own SEPBs that
we consider promising. As before, an essential
condition is that we avoid contaminating our data set
through bias in our selection criteria, which would
result in our including principally SEPBs whose
strategy and structure are consistent with our
hypotheses.
Additionally, researchers would probably want to
repeat the analyses several years later, when there will
be a larger number of SEPBs for which success can
unambiguously be demonstrated. It would also be
interesting to see after a couple of years how many
changes we would have in our classification of the
successful websites on our list.
When the research is conducted at a later time,
two additional studies will be possible. First, it is
reasonable to expect that the sharing economy marketplace will have become much more crowded and much
more competitive. It is likely that the simple binary
classification we used here — cost / efficiency based
strategies and differentiation / resonance strategies,
will have ceased to be fully effective. More complex,
hybrid strategies will probably have been adopted, and
a more complex set of hypotheses will be required to
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examine the more complex relationship between strategy and structure that will have emerged. Additionally, some SEPBs will have failed, and we will be able
to examine both surviving and failed websites to ascertain whether lack of internal or external consistency
was a significant contributor to website failure.
Finally, other definitions of internal and external
consistency may be useful in testing for different
elements of website design or of interface design.
These may be equally valid and may produce even
stronger results or more useful insights.
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